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Abstract
Cascading failures are one of the main reasons for blackouts in power trans-
mission grids. The topology of a power grid, together with its operative state deter-
mine, for the most part, the robustness of the power grid against cascading failures.
Secure electrical power supply requires, together with careful operation, a robust
design of the electrical power grid topology. This paper investigates the impact
of a power grid topology on its robustness against cascading failures. Currently,
the impact of the topology on a grid robustness is mainly assessed by using purely
topological approaches that fail to capture the essence of electric power flow. This
paper proposes a metric, the effective graph resistance, that relates the topology
of a power grid to its robustness against cascading failures by deliberate attacks,
while also taking the fundamental characteristics of the electric power grid into
account such as power flow allocation according to Kirchoff Laws. Experimental
verification shows that the proposed metric anticipates the grid robustness accu-
rately. The proposed metric is used to optimize a grid topology for a higher level
of robustness. To demonstrate its applicability, the metric is applied on the IEEE
118 bus power system to improve its robustness against cascading failures.
1 Introduction
Electric power is indispensable to modern societies. Security and availability of power
supply is crucial. Disruption of power delivery systems has severe effects on the public
order and substantial economic cost for society [1]. The safe operation of the power
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grid greatly reduces the risk of large-scale blackouts. Many countries, however, suf-
fer from catastrophic blackouts paralysing daily life [2, 3]. Analysis of international
blackout data reveals that the probability distribution of the blackout sizes decreases
with the size of the blackout in an approximate power law regime [4] with an exponent
between −1 and −2, i.e. doubling the blackout size approximately halves its probabil-
ity suggesting large scale blackouts are more likely than expected.
Cascading failures are the consequence of the collective dynamics of the complex
power grid. Large scale cascades are typically due to propagation of a local failure into
the global network. Consequently, analysing and mitigating cascading failures requires
a system level approach. Recent advances in the field of network science [5, 6, 7, 8]
reveal the promising potential of complex networks theory to investigate power grids
vulnerability at a system level.
This paper considers the vulnerability of a system as a sensitivity to threats (i.e.
malicious attacks) and disturbances (e.g. random failures) that possibly limit the abil-
ity of the system to accomplish its tasks, and provide the intended services. As the
polar opposite of vulnerability, robustness refers to the ability of a system to avoid
malfunctioning when a fraction of its elements fail [9].
The operative state (e.g. loading level and power flow distribution), the structural
aspects of a power grid (e.g. type of buses and their interconnection), and design
choices of engineering systems (e.g. the protection systems, automatic controls, and
towers and insulators) determine the robustness against cascading failures in a power
grid. Increasing a power grid robustness requires a careful assessment of engineer-
ing system design choices and optimization of the operative state and the topology
of the grid. The operative state of a power grid is continuously changing while the
structure remains mainly unchanged. Optimization of the operative state of a power
grid is a short-term optimization problem and requires a dynamic optimization ap-
proach [10, 11, 12]. On the other hand, optimization of the topology is a long-term
optimization problem and requires investigating the impact of the grid topology on
cascading failures. This paper focuses on the optimization of the topology, and in-
vestigates the relationship between a power grid topology and its robustness against
cascading failures.
One way to analyse the impact of the structural aspects of a power grid on the cas-
cading effect is investigating the relationship between the robustness level against cas-
cading failures and the general network properties of power grids. The electric power
grid has small-world characteristics [6, 13]. A small average shortest path length (to-
gether with high clustering coefficient [14]) is one of the key characteristics of the
small-world phenomenon. In small-world networks, the average shortest path length
might dominate the network dynamics including, for example disease spreading [13].
These studies/results motivate power system researchers to investigate the impact of av-
erage shortest path length on the cascading failures robustness in power grids [13, 15].
They deploy a purely topological approach and assume that electric power behaves as
a discrete data packet and follows the shortest or the most efficient path between two
nodes. Relying on this assumption, the average shortest path length is determined, and
its impact on the network robustness is investigated. However, this purely topological
approach does not comply with the fundamental characteristics of power grids. Elec-
tric power obeys the laws of Kirchoff and flows through all available paths rather than
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following a distinct path (e.g. shortest path) like e.g. a data packet in a data com-
munication network. Therefore, the notion of distance needs to be tailored based on
power systems fundamentals. This paper proposes the effective resistance as a measure
of electrical path length between two nodes, and the effective graph resistance as a
metric referring to electrical average path length of a power grid. The effective graph
resistance [14] relates to the impact of the topology on cascading failure robustness
while accounting for the fundamental properties of power grids such as power flow
distribution through the grid according to Kirchoff Laws.
2 Dynamic Model of Cascading Failures in Power Grids
A power grid is a three-layered complex interconnected network consisting of genera-
tion, transmission, and distribution parts. Electric power is shipped from the generation
buses to distribution substations through the transmission buses, all interconnected by
transmission lines. Electric power flows in a grid according to Kirchoff’s laws. Ac-
cordingly, impedances, voltage levels at each individual power station, voltage phase
differences between power stations and loads at terminal stations control the power
flow in the grid. AC power flow equations are non-linear equations that approximate
the flows of both active and reactive powers. DC load flow equations are a linearised
version of the AC power flow equations considering only flow of active power [16].
DC power flow analysis introduces an average line flow error up to 5% while it is 7 to
10 times faster than AC load flow model [16]. Following Ref. [17, 18, 19], this paper
deploys DC load flow analysis to estimate the flow values across the network.
The maximum capacity (i.e. flow limit) of a line is defined as the maximum power
flow that can be afforded by the line. The flow limit of a transmission line is imposed
by thermal, stability or voltage drop constraints [20]. As many other recent studies [21,
22, 23, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27], this paper assumes that the maximum capacity of a line
relates to its base (i.e. initial) load as follows:
Ci = αiLi(0) (1)
where Ci is the maximum capacity, Li(0) is the base load, and αi [21] is the tolerance
parameter of line i. In a power grid, each line has a relay protecting it from permanent
damage due to e.g. excessive flows. For instance, in case of overloading, an over-
current relay notifies a circuit breaker to trip a line when the current of the line exceeds
its rated limit (i.e. maximum capacity) and this violation lasts long enough to perma-
nently damage the line. For the sake of simplicity, this paper assumes a deterministic
model for the line tripping mechanism, i.e. a circuit breaker for a line trips at the mo-
ment the flow of the line exceeds its rated limit. While the over-current [28] relays
are not the only relays that are used in the power transmission grid, this paper mod-
els the other type of relaying mechanisms (e.g. distance and differential protection) as
over-current relays.
An initial outage of a component changes the balance of the power flow distribution
over the grid and causes a redistribution of the power flow over the network. This
dynamic response of the system to this triggering event might overload other parts in
the network. The protection mechanism trips these newly overloaded components, and
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the power flow is again redistributed potentially resulting in new overloads. In case
of islanding, cascading failures continue in each island in which generators or loads
are shed respectively to attain a power balance. The cascade of failures continues until
no more components are overloaded. After the cascade subsides, the robustness of the
grid against cascading failures is quantified in terms of the fraction of the served power
demand (DS) after the cascading failures.
3 Effective Graph Resistance in Electric Power Grids
This section explains the relevant basic concepts from complex networks theory, ex-
plains the effective graph resistance, and elaborates on how it is computed in electric
power grids.
3.1 Complex networks preliminaries
A network G(N,L) consisting of a set of nodes N and links L, can fully be represented
by its adjacency matrixA. The adjacency matrix of a simple, unweighted graph G(N,L)
is an N ×N symmetric matrix reflecting the interconnection of the nodes in the graph:
aij = 0 indicates that there is no edge, otherwise aij = 1. In case of a weighted graph,
the network is represented by a weighted adjacency matrix W where wij corresponds
to the weight of the line between nodes i and j; a weight can be a distance, cost, or
delay.
The Laplacian matrix [14] Q is another way to fully characterize a graph, and is
defined as:
Q = ∆−A (2)
where ∆ is the diagonal matrix of the strengths of G: δi=
∑N
j wij . Hence, the Lapla-
cian can be constructed as follows:
Qij =

δi, if i = j.
−wij , if i 6= j and (i, j) ∈ L
0, otherwise.
(3)
where δi is the strength of node i, and L is the set of links in G.
A path Pij between pair of nodes i and j refers to the set of links connecting these
nodes. The path length l(Pij) is the sum of the weights of constituent edges in the
path Pij . The shortest path length l(P ∗ij) is the minimizer of l(Pij) over all Pij . The
average shortest path length lG of a network G is defined as:
lG =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i 6=j∈G
l(P ∗ij) (4)
where N is the number of nodes in the graph.
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3.2 Effective graph resistance and its computation in electric power
grids
The effective resistance [14] Rij between a pair of nodes i and j is the potential dif-
ference between these nodes when a unit current is injected at node i and withdrawn
at node j. And the effective graph resistance RG is the sum of the individual effective
resistance between each pair of nodes in the network. Computation of the effective
graph resistance for a power grid necessitates information about the topology of the
grid (i.e. interconnection of nodes), and reactance (or susceptance [29]) values of the
transmission lines in the grid. The effective graph resistance can be computed in two
different ways: (a) by aggregating the effective resistances between each pair of nodes,
and (b) by the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix of the grid.
The required steps to compute the effective graph resistance based on pairwise ef-
fective resistances are (i) constructing the Laplacian matrix of the grid, (ii) determining
the generalised inverse of the Laplacian matrix, (iii) computing effective resistances
between each pair of nodes, and (iv) summing up the effective resistances.
The Laplacian matrix of a power grid Q reflects the interconnection of buses with
transmission lines. The weight wij corresponds to the susceptance (i.e. inverse of
reactance) value between nodes i and j. The Laplacian matrix constructed by the sus-
ceptance values is equivalent to the admittance matrix in the electrical power systems
theory.
The effective resistance Rij between any pair of nodes i and j is computed as:
Rij = Q
+
ii − 2Q+ij +Q+jj (5)
where Q+ is the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of the Q.
The effective graph resistance RG of a power network is then computed by sum-
ming up all the effective resistances between all pairs in a network.
RG =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
Rij (6)
Another way to compute the effective graph resistance of a power grid requires
computation of the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix of the grid. This approach
requires summing the inverse of the eigenvalues:
RG = N
N−1∑
i=1
1
µi
(7)
where µi is the ith eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix, and µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ ... ≥ µN−1 ≥
µN . This methodology is computationally more efficient, but it does not give any
insight into the individual electrical path lengths between pair of buses.
4 Effective Graph Resistance as a Robustness Metric
Modelling power grid dynamics requires taking the power flow into account. In a dy-
namic power grid model, electric power flows through multiple paths. This precludes
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the existence of a distinct path (and subsequently the existence of the shortest path)
between two nodes in a physical power grid. Yet, the concept of equivalent impedance
makes it possible to determine a distinct electrical path between two nodes by concep-
tually replacing the multiple paths between two nodes with a single equivalent path.
Fig. 1 illustrates the concept.
A"
B"
Z1" ZL"
A"
B"
Zeq"Z2" …." ZL,1"
VA"
VB" VB"
VA"
Figure 1: The equivalent impedance transforms the multiple L paths between nodes A
andB with impedances Z1, Z2, .., ZL (on the left hand side) to a one single conceptual
path with an impedance value Zeq,AB (on the right hand side).
The concept of electrical path length makes it possible to construct the electrical
topology of a power grid. An electrical topology of a power grid shows the electrical
connections/path lengths (i.e. equivalent impedances) between buses, rather than the
physical connections as a physical topology does. In a power grid, the actual "dis-
tance" between two nodes is the electrical path length, and not the physical distance
(or number of lines). Accordingly, the electrical topology of a power grid governs the
network dynamics rather than the physical topology. Fig. 2 shows the physical and the
electrical topology of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 30
buses power system [30].
The initial concepts of "electrical distance" are discussed by power system re-
searchers [31, 32, 33], and also by mathematicians as effective resistance [34, 35].
In a power grid, the effective resistance Rij between buses i and j equals the equiv-
alent impedance between these buses. Hence, in the electrical topology in Fig. 2, the
connections are the effective conductances (1/Rij) between each pair of nodes. The
effective graph resistance RG of a power grid G is an aggregate value of all effective
resistances between any pair of nodes in a grid (see Eq. 6).
The existence of parallel paths between two nodes in a physical power grid topol-
ogy, and a homogeneous distribution of their impedance values result in a smaller ef-
fective resistance between these two nodes (i.e. a stronger connection between these
nodes in the electrical topology). The number of parallel paths in the physical topology
refers to the number of redundant (backup) paths. In case of a failure in one of the paths
between two nodes, the power flow carried by the rendered path is distributed over the
6
21
1
2
5
22
7
14
3
13
12
16
4
17
28
8
29
27
11
6
10
25
9
30
24
2320
19
15
18
26
6
12
8
710
11
5
9
30
28
4
1
3
29
2
2423
25
27
21
22
26
20
19
18
13
17
14
16
15
Figure 2: The physical (left) and the electrical (right) topology of IEEE 30 power
system. In the physical topology the conductances, and in the electrical topology the
equivalent conductances (i.e. 1/Zeq), are used as weights for a better illustration. A
relatively thicker and more visible line corresponds to a stronger connection/a shorter
electric path length (i.e. a smaller effective resistance), while a relatively thinner and
less visible line corresponds to a relatively weaker connection/ a larger electric path
length (i.e. larger effective resistance).
backup paths. Therefore, a higher number of backup paths implies a more robust net-
work against cascading failures due to line overloads. On the other hand, a relatively
more homogeneous distribution of the impedance values results in a relatively more
homogeneous distribution of power flow over these parallel paths increasing the ro-
bustness of the power grid against cascading failures [10, 11]. Therefore, a power
grid with a relatively smaller effective graph resistance implies a relatively more robust
power grid with respect to cascading failures.
5 Effective Graph Resistance and Power Grid Robust-
ness: Experimental Verification
This section verifies the potential of effective graph resistance to anticipate the cascad-
ing failures robustness of power networks. Experimental verification of the proposed
robustness metric requires (i) creating synthetic test systems, (ii) determining the ef-
fective graph resistance of these synthetic test systems (i.e. theoretical results) and
their robustness levels by simulations (i.e. experimental results that are considered as
the ground truth), and (iii) quantifying the correlation between the theoretical results
and experimental results to assess whether the effective graph resistance anticipates the
power grid robustness with respect to cascading failures.
5.1 Test systems
The data required for the metric verification analysis includes the topology of a power
grid (i.e. interconnection of buses with lines), reactance values of transmission lines,
the types buses and their generation capacity and load values. Since the IEEE power
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systems provide all these data, they are considered as the reference systems and addi-
tional synthetic test systems are created based on these reference systems.
The synthetic test systems are generated to have exactly the same properties as the
reference IEEE test system (e.g. type and number of buses/lines with their interconnec-
tion and demand/generation capacity values) except for the effective graph resistance.
In this way, in each test system, all the parameters that have an impact on the robustness
(e.g. topology, generation/loading profile, and loading level) are fixed, except for the
effective graph resistance. This assures that the difference in the robustness levels of
these test systems is due to the change in the effective graph resistance of these grids,
and makes possible to assess the impact of the effective graph resistance on the grid
robustness.
When creating a new synthetic test system based on the IEEE reference system,
it is crucial to have a different effective graph resistance and to keep other important
aspects for the robustness unchanged. To achieve this, an arbitrary number of the links
of the reference IEEE test systems is randomly chosen and the reactance values of these
transmission lines are increased. For example, when creating a synthetic test system
based on the IEEE 118 power system [30], e.g. 4 transmission lines are randomly
chosen: l1, l2, l3, l4. Then the reactance values of these lines (i.e. x1, x2, x3, x4) are
doubled and a new synthetic test system is created with the new reactance values: 2x1,
2x2, 2x3, 2x4 for lines l1, l2, l3, l4 respectively.
The new synthetic test system has an increased RG since the effective graph re-
sistance is a monotonic increasing function of the individual reactance values in a net-
work [35]. It also has a different robustness level against cascading failures because the
manipulated impedances affect the power flow distribution in the networks [10, 11].
A second synthetic test system is created from the reference IEEE 118 power sys-
tem by increasing the reactance values of the same lines l1, l2, l3, l4 by a factor of three
resulting in the impedance values of 3x1, 3x2, 3x3, 3x4, respectively. In this way, the
additional synthetic test systems are created.
5.2 Robustness levels by effective graph resistance and by simula-
tions
The effective graph resistance supposedly quantifies the theoretical robustness levels
of the test systems against cascading failures. The RG of the test systems will be com-
pared to the simulation-based robustness levels to assess whether RG truly anticipates
the grid robustness. The computation of RG requires data about the admittance ma-
trix of the systems (i.e. reactance values of the transmission lines and the topology of
the grid). The effective graph resistance of each test system is calculated by Eq. 5 and
Eq. 6 in Sec. 3. The experimental robustness levels of created synthetic power grids are
determined using simulations. MATCASC [36] (a MATLAB-based tool implementing
cascading failure simulations in power grids) is used to simulate cascading failures and
to quantify the grid robustness. Cascading failures by targeted attacks are simulated for
different values of tolerance parameter α (i.e. for different loading levels). DS metric
is used to quantify the robustness of the test systems after the cascades subsides.
This paper uses an attack strategy based on the electrical node significance met-
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Figure 3: The robustness curve for the IEEE 118 test system
ric [10, 11]. The electrical node significance is a contextual node centrality measure,
specifically designed for power grids. The electrical node significance δ of a node i is
defined as the amount of power distributed by node i, normalized by the total amount
of the power that is distributed in the entire grid:
δi =
Pi∑N
j=1 Pj
(8)
where Pi stands for total power distributed by node i while N refers to number of
nodes in the network. This paper attacks a power grid by targeting the most heavily
loaded outgoing link from the node with the highest electrical node significance in the
network. Removal of this link most likely results in the largest cascading failure in the
power network [37].
Assessing the robustness of a power grid against cascading failures by targeted
attacks for an interval of tolerance parameters [αmin, αmax] subdivided by ∆α (i.e.
a set of tolerance parameters [αmin, αmin + ∆α, αmin + 2∆α, ..., αmax]) results in
the robustness curve of the grid. For example, Fig. 3 shows the robustness curve for
the IEEE 118 power system [30] obtained for [αmin=1, αmax=5] with ∆α=0.05. The
robustness curve in Fig. 3 suggests that, when the network is loaded by 20% (i.e. α=5),
an attack results in the loss of almost 10% of the total demand. However, an attack
when α=1.3 (i.e. loading level ' 77%) results in collapse of the network and only
20% of the total demand can be satisfied.
Traditionally, power grid researchers focus on the robustness of a grid for a specific
tolerance level of the grid. However, this paper considers the robustness of a power
grid over the whole spectrum of tolerance levels (i.e. loading levels), and defines math-
ematically the normalized area r below the robustness curve as an empirical metric that
quantifies the power grid robustness against cascading failures. The normalized area
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Table 1: Effective graph resistance (RG) and simulation-based robustness levels (r) of
IEEE 30 and 3 synthetic test systems
RG r(%)
IEEE 30 151.86 72.66
Synthetic grid 1 162.71 68.51
Synthetic grid 2 169.43 67.18
Synthetic grid 3 174.07 66.96
below a robustness curve is computed by a Riemann sum [38]:
r =
1
(αmax − αmin)
∑
i∈d
DS(αi)∆α (9)
where DS(αi) is the DS after a cascading failure is triggered by an attack when the
tolerance of the network is αi, and d is the size of the set of tolerance parameters at
which the robustness levels are determined. Because the maximum value of DS is
1, (αmax − αmin) refers to the maximum possible area below the robustness curve.
Consequently, the factor 1/(αmax − αmin) in Eq. 9 normalizes the area below the
robustness curve ensuring that r has a value between 0 and 1. Evaluation of Eq. 9 for
the robustness curve of a grid results in the experimental robustness level of the grid
with respect to cascading failures. On the other hand, the vulnerability of the grid is
the complementary of the robustness of the grid and defined as:
v = 1− r (10)
where v is the measure of vulnerability of the system, also having a value between 0
and 1.
5.3 Assessing the effectiveness of the effective graph resistance in
anticipating power grid robustness
To gain more insight into the impact of RG on the grid robustness, first a qualitative
analysis is performed for a relatively small set of test systems. The IEEE 30 power
system (see Fig. 2) is considered as a reference system. 4 lines are chosen randomly:
l2 (connecting nodes 1 and 3), l14 (connecting nodes 9 and 10), l38 (connecting nodes
27 and 30), l41 (connecting nodes 6 and 28), and based on the methodology explained
in Sec. 5.1, three additional test systems are created. The robustness of these systems
are determined by RG and by r. Table 1 provides the RG and r values while Fig. 4
shows the robustness curves of these test systems.
The effective graph resistance is a monotonic increasing function of the individual
impedance (consisting of resistance and reactance) values in the grid [35]. Accordingly,
in Table 1, RG increases as a result of the increase of individual reactance values. This
indicates that the typical average electrical path length between the buses in the syn-
thetic grids is increasing incrementally making these grids relatively loosely coupled.
On the other hand, as a result of the increase of reactance values in these synthetic grids,
10
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Figure 4: The robustness curves for the IEEE 30 and first 3 synthetic test systems,
and the corresponding robustness (i.e. r) values. The test systems have their effective
graph resistances in an ascending order, while their robustness levels are step by step
increasing.
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Figure 5: Experimental verification of the effective graph resistance for IEEE 30 test
system. For 100 synthetic test systems, on the left hand side the effective graph re-
sistance and the vulnerability values are plotted. On the right hand side a scatter plot
visualizes the correlation between effective graph resistance and system vulnerability.
Results show that the effective graph resistance captures the system vulnerability accu-
rately.
r becomes step by step smaller: synthetic grid I is more robust compared to synthetic
grid II, synthetic grid II is more robust compared to synthetic grid III, and so forth.
Hence, the theoretical results (i.e. RG) are evidently in line with the simulation results,
and suggest that increasing the effective graph resistance of a power grid makes it less
robust (i.e. more vulnerable) against cascading failures by targeted attacks. Fig. 4 vi-
sualizes the impact of RG on grid robustness: an increase in RG makes the power grid
robustness smaller.
A quantitative assessment of the impact of the effective graph resistance on the
power grid robustness requires the robustness analysis for a larger set of networks. Ac-
cordingly, the small set of 4 test systems (see Table 1) is expanded to a set of 100 test
systems. The effective graph resistances and the empirical robustness levels (i.e. r)
of these networks are determined. The correlation level between these theoretical and
experimental robustness levels is quantified: the linear correlation coefficient between
RG and r is over -90%. This nearly perfect anti-correlation level suggests that the
effective graph resistance anticipates the power grid robustness with respect to cascad-
ing failures accurately. Fig. 5 plots RG, v, and scatter diagram of RG and v. Results
in Fig. 5 visualizes how the effective graph resistance captures the power grid robust-
ness. The vulnerability is plotted rather than the experimental robustness r for better
illustration of coherence between the theoretical and experimental results.
Alternating the reactance values in a grid causes a different power flow distribution
in the grid and, in turn, results in a different level of robustness against cascading
failures [10, 11]. Fig. 5 shows that the vulnerability v reflects the variations in RG of
the power grids accurately: a fast increase in the grid effective graph resistance results
in a fast increase in the grid vulnerability (i.e. fast drop in grid robustness ), while a
slight increase in the grid effective graph resistance causes a slight increase in the grid
vulnerability (i.e. a slight drop in the grid robustness).
12
0 20 40 60 80 100
1470
1480
1490
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
Test system ID
Ef
fe
ct
ive
 g
ra
ph
 re
sis
ta
nc
e
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.38
0.39
0.4
0.41
0.42
0.43
Test system ID
Vu
ln
er
ab
ilit
y
Effective graph resistance vs. System vulnerability
Figure 6: Experimental verification of the effective graph resistance for IEEE 118 test
system. For 100 synthetic test systems, the effective graph resistance (on the left hand
side), and the vulnerability values (on the right hand side) are plotted.
To investigate the validity of the impact of RG on power grid robustness, the ro-
bustness analysis is performed for the larger IEEE 118 power systems. Again four lines
are randomly chosen: l31 (connecting buses 23 to 25), l35 (connecting buses 28 to 29),
l93 (connecting buses 59 to 63), and l175 (connecting buses 109 to 110). Furthermore,
99 additional test systems are created. For these test systems, RG is computed and the
experimental robustness levels are obtained by r (and grid vulnerability by v). Fig. 6
shows the RG and v values for the 100 test systems. The correlation level between RG
and r resides again over -90%.
The experimental results (see Fig. 5 and Fig. 6) show that effective graph resis-
tance captures power grid robustness very accurately and suggests that an increased
effective graph resistance results in a less robust power grid against cascading failures,
as proposed in Sec. 4.
6 Use Case: Application for Power Grids
The aptitude of effective graph resistance to relate a power grid topology to its ro-
bustness can be exploited in different ways, including designing robust networks from
scratch and identifying critical components in a power grid. Furthermore RG also acts
as a measure based on which a grid topology is optimized to maximize the grid ro-
bustness. The next section focusses on optimization of the IEEE 118 power system
topology for a higher level of robustness against cascading failures.
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6.1 Upgrading IEEE 118 power system to improve grid robustness
As a response to blackouts, additional transmission lines are placed to increase the
power grid robustness. Determining the right pair of buses to connect in order to max-
imize the grid robustness is the challenge1. A solution to this problem requires (i) de-
termining all possible additional transmission lines (i.e. candidate transmission lines),
and (ii) assessing the impact of each candidate transmission line on the effective graph
resistance.
For a grid consisting of N buses and L transmission lines, an additional line can be
placed between any unconnected pair of nodes. Therefore, there are in total N(N−1)2 −
L number of lines that can be added to an existing power grid.
To assess the impact of an additional line on the effective graph resistance (i.e. on
the grid robustness), this section deploys an analogous approach to the one given in [39,
40]: the optimum location for an additional line is determined by assessing its relative
change on the effective graph resistance value of the original power grid. Because
the effective graph resistance is a monotonic decreasing function of the number of
lines [35] in a grid, adding a transmission line to an existing grid decreases the effective
graph resistance of the grid. Therefore, the optimum location of an additional line is
determined based on the relative decrease in RG that is caused by adding the line l:
∆RlG =
RG −RG+l
RG
(11)
where G, RG(G + l) is the effective graph resistance of the improved grid, and ∆RlG
is the relative decrease in the effective graph resistance of G as a result of adding line
l.
The IEEE 118 power system is considered as a test case and the optimum location
for an additional line to upgrade the power system is investigated. The IEEE 118 test
system has 118 buses and 186 transmission lines. Hence, there are 6724 possible lines
to be added. The reactance value of a candidate transmission line is assumed to be
the average of all transmission lines in the IEEE 118 test system. For each of these
candidate lines, Eq. 11 is evaluated and its impact on the effective graph resistance is
determined. From these 6724 lines, Table 2 shows the top 10 most influential transmis-
sion lines to be added to IEEE 118 power system, while Fig. 7 plots the lines that have
an impact higher than 0.7%.
The results in Table 2 and Fig. 7 can be used as starting point for an economic anal-
ysis. Since the impact of adding a line is not very different for the top ten candidates
(see Table 2 and Fig. 7) a cost function can be used to determine which of these lines
provides a significant increase in grid robustness at an acceptable or minimal cost.
Table 2 shows that the largest decrease in the effective graph resistance is achieved
by adding a transmission line between nodes 111 and 117 (line ID 73 in Fig. 7). Placing
a line between these nodes results in a decrease of nearly 0.79% in the effective graph
resistance of the original power system.
To assess the impact of placement of the additional line l111−117 on the grid ro-
bustness, the robustness curve of the improved topology, and its robustness r are de-
1This section focuses on maximizing the grid robustness rather than minimizing the economic cost of
placing a transmission line.
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Figure 7: Relative decrease in the effective graph resistance as a result of adding a line
for IEEE 118 test case. From 6724 total lines, 74 lines whose addition to IEEE 118
buses power system results in a RG decrease of 0.7% or higher.
Table 2: The top 10 most influential lines to add in IEEE 118 system
Line ID ∆RlG(%)
l111−117 0.788
l112−117 0.783
l1−111 0.774
l1−112 0.769
l2−111 0.768
l3−111 0.767
l87−117 0.765
l2−112 0.763
l3−112 0.761
l110−117 0.760
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Figure 8: Robustness curves of IEEE 118 and improved IEEE 118 power systems. The
difference (i.e. robustness improvement) is highlighted.
termined. The improved grid has a robustness r=0.6570 which is an increase by 6.7%
compared to the original grid robustness (i.e. 0.6182). Fig. 8 plots the robustness curves
of both topologies, and highlights the improvement in the grid robustness (shaded area
in grey in Fig. 8).
7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper proposes the effective graph resistance RG as a metric to assess the impact
of the power grid topology G on the robustness against cascading failures due to line
overloads by targeted attacks. The effective graph resistance quantifies a power grid
robustness by taking the number of backup paths and their ability to accommodate
power flows into account. The experimental verification shows that RG anticipates the
grid robustness against cascading line failures accurately. Experimental results suggest
that increasing the effective graph resistance of a power grid results in a decreased
grid robustness against cascading failures by targeted attacks. The proposed metric is
used to optimize the topology of the IEEE 118 power system to improve its robustness.
Results show that adding a single line to IEEE 118 power system based on the effective
graph resistance analysis improves the grid robustness by 6.7%.
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